跟老刘混去<财经>年会现场溜达了一圈, 听了一个房地产的谈话栏目.  三个主题, 房地产, 金融衍生品, PE. 场场爆满, 站的地方都没有. 等了半天,看有人出来才找到空站着听完了.

 

这个年会还是层面挺高, 晚上溜达一下我起码是见着了活着的任志强,潘石屹,还有老乡伏明霞的老公,梁锦松. 简单说说房地产论坛的情况.

 

基本嘉宾构成: 主持人1名+房地产商4个(包括1个香港恒隆地产的老总)+投行2个+经济学家2个. 

成分构成: 鼓吹型: 房地产商3个+投行2个+经济学家1个

                中立理性型: 房地产商1个

                危机泡沫论: 经济学家1个

 

需要指出的是, 王石不在场, 并且在场的鼓吹型的嘉宾在谈笑风生之间已经把"王石盖的房子是劣质房子"作为定论嘲笑. 而就本人曾经在房地产界做过的朋友的意见, 万科的房子一直是相当不错的.

 

从嘉宾构成和立场可以得出的基本观点:

一.  话语权仍然在一个庞大的利益集团手中, 因为王石的不合作他已经被这个集团排除在外.

二. 强盗头子可恶, 但是吠得最凶的肯定是那些"帮忙的"和"帮闲的".

三. 中国基金界无甚希望. 不仅智商不高,而且道德也高不哪去.

 

 

鼓吹方的基本观点还是老几条, 无甚新意. 明明开头都说要过冬了, 遇到困难了, 但是一说起问题来那是相当相当理直气壮. 鼓吹方用了很多数据来证明自己的观点, 但是中国的官方数据, 欧卖糕得.  主要观点如下:

 

一. 房地产市场没有泡沫.

(点评: 经济学有千千万万的理论, 正说反说总能够说通道理.  在1987年版的Palgrave经济学大辞典中引用著名经济学家，前美国经济学会会长金德尔伯格(C.Kindleberger)的话重新定义泡沫经济:“泡沫状态这个名词，随便一点说，就是一种或一系列资产在一个连续过程中陡然涨价，开始的价格上升会使人们产生还要涨价的预期，于是又吸引了新的买主--这些人一般只是想通过买卖牟取利润，而对这些资产本身的使用和产生盈利的能力是不感兴趣的。随着涨价常常是预期的逆转，接着就是价格暴跌，最后以金融危机告终。

 

简单来说, 购买方不是使用方, 也就是说, 需求当中有水分.)

 

二. 中国房地产市场没有供应过剩.

(点评: 任总用了很多数据来说明有多少居民,有多少需求,收入有多少增量. 但是明显地回避了其他问题: 1. 官方数据有多准. 2. 居民消费需求中多少是有效需求. 既然任总明白说过是为富人盖房子, 那请说明富人群的需求是多少. 3. 收入增量是平均值, 考虑到巨大的贫富差距, 作为大部分的平民阶层收入的增长率值得商榷. 像唯一有意思的经济学家谢国忠所说: 看人口的的话, 干么不去非洲建房??)

 

三. 房地产商辛辛苦苦盖房,赚得是辛苦钱而非暴利.

(点评: 我承认房地产商赚钱的利润率不如矿老板, 但是仍然属于暴利行业. 尽管看上去百分比没有史玉柱那么高, 但是盘面的大小为何不提. 一千万的100%和一亿的50%无法比. 可以说有很高的寻租成本, 但是与建筑成本相比, 房地产是绝对的暴利)

 

四. 房地产业不是死在自己的泡沫上,而是政府的乱调控上.

(点评: 根据刚刚泡沫的定义, 政府的调控也不过是为了限制投机性购房. 有钢性需求的话, 这些根本不足以影响房地产市场.

 

五. 保持房地产业的高速发展是保证经济发展的唯一途径.

(点评: 这些话TND更像是威胁. 由此可见当年经济方针错误已经造成了无可估量的影响. 房地产完蛋了, 钢材用量会锐减, 相关的产业都会遭受损失. 没错,但是应该意识到的是如果不是当年毫无节制的扩张, 钢厂的产能根本不会扩大到如今的规模. 如今的中国经济骑在房地产这头猛虎的身上, 上下不得. 但是与其维持虚伪的繁荣, 我宁可一步一步刺破泡沫, )

 

 

 

那个离谱的投行人士(貌似是高干家庭美景) 唧唧歪歪没完地指责大众对着房地产商就好像批斗周扒皮一样. 另一个投行的人士问了周围几个有钱人, 其中一个女的有五十多双鞋, 十几个钱包, 得出了中国人可以几年不消费的脑残结论. 还有对比投资股市的, 说投资房子仍然是最好的投资方式. 我的娘啊, 跟中国股市比, 那就好像跟武大郎比身高,和国足比足球一样.

 

这些杯钵满盆的既得利益者大略也小看了人民的智商. 任志强说老百姓是接受不了自己买不起好房子这种刺激而眼红, 产生"仇富"心态. 对着全世界最善良最温顺的老百姓说这种话可以直接去跳楼. 要知道, 真正"仇富"的人是不多的, 人都是向往财富的.  要看到的是"仇富"之后的真正被憎恶的对象——财富和权力的叠加。

 

财富借助权力完成了短时间内的光速积累，蚕食了劳动者辛辛苦苦劳作的积蓄。问题是所有这一切的始作俑者——govtment，究竟有没有能力收拾自己铺的烂摊子？摇摇头，叹口气，洗洗睡吧。

Angry China

May 1st 2008
From The Economist print edition

The recent glimpses of a snarling China should scare the country's government as much as the world

CHINA is in a frightening mood. The sight of thousands of Chinese people waving xenophobic fists suggests that a country on its way to becoming a superpower may turn out to be a more dangerous force than optimists had hoped. But it isn't just foreigners who should be worried by these scenes: the Chinese government, which has encouraged this outburst of nationalism, should also be afraid.

For three decades, having shed communism in all but the name of its ruling party, China's government has justified its monopolistic hold on power through economic advance. Many Chinese enjoy a prosperity undreamt of by their forefathers. For them, though, it is no longer enough to be reminded of the grim austerity of their parents' childhoods. They need new aspirations.

The government's solution is to promise them that China will be restored to its rightful place at the centre of world affairs. Hence the pride at winning the Olympics, and the fury at the embarrassing protests during the torch relay. But the appeal to nationalism is a double-edged sword: while it provides a useful outlet for domestic discontents (see article), it could easily turn on the government itself.

A million mutinies

The torch relay has galvanised protests about all manner of alleged Chinese crimes: in Tibet, in China's broader human-rights record, in its cosy relations with repellent regimes. And these in turn have drawn counter-protests from thousands of expatriate Chinese, from Chinese within the country and on the internet.

Chinese rage has focused on the alleged “anti-China” bias of the Western press, which is accused of ignoring violence by Tibetans in the unrest in March. From this starting-point China's defenders have gone on to denounce the entire edifice of Western liberal democracy as a sham. Using its tenets to criticise China is, they claim, sheer hypocrisy. They cite further evidence of double standards: having exported its dirtiest industries to China, the West wants the country to curb its carbon emissions, potentially impeding its growth and depriving newly well-off Chinese of their right to a motor car. And as the presidential election campaign in America progresses, more China-bashing can be expected, with protectionism disguised as noble fury at “coddling dictators”.

China's rage is out of all proportion to the alleged offences. It reflects a fear that a resentful, threatened West is determined to thwart China's rise. The Olympics have become a symbol of China's right to the respect it is due. Protests, criticism and boycott threats are seen as part of a broader refusal to accept and accommodate China.

There is no doubt genuine fury in China at these offences; yet the impression the response gives of a people united behind the government is an illusion. China, like India, is a land of a million mutinies now. Legions of farmers are angry that their land has been swallowed up for building by greedy local officials. People everywhere are aghast at the poisoning of China's air, rivers and lakes in the race for growth. Hardworking, honest citizens chafe at corrupt officials who treat them with contempt and get rich quick. And the party still makes an ass of the law and a mockery of justice.

Herein lies the danger for the government. Popular anger, once roused, can easily switch targets. This weekend China will be commemorating an event seen as pivotal in its long revolution—the protests on May 4th 1919 against the humiliation of China by the Versailles treaty (which bequeathed German “concessions” in China to Japan). The Communist Party had roots in that movement. Now, as then, protests at perceived slights against China's dignity could turn against a government accused of not doing enough to safeguard it.

Remember the ides of May

Western businessmen and policymakers are pulled in opposite directions by Chinese anger. As the sponsors of the Olympics have learned to their cost, while consumer- and shareholder-activists in the West demand they take a stand against perceived Chinese abuses, in China itself firms' partners and customers are all too ready to take offence. Western policymakers also face a difficult balancing act. They need to recognise that China has come a long way very quickly, and offers its citizens new opportunities and even new freedoms, though these are still far short of what would constitute democracy. Yet that does not mean they should pander to China's pride. Western leaders have a duty to raise concerns about human rights, Tibet and other “sensitive” subjects. They do not need to resign themselves to ineffectiveness: up to a point, pressure works: China has been modestly helpful over Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan. It has even agreed to reopen talks with the Dalai Lama's representatives. This has happened because of, not despite, criticism from abroad.

Pessimists fear that if China faces too much such pressure, hardliners within the ruling elite will triumph over the “moderates” in charge now. But even if they did, it is hard to see how they could end the 30-year-old process of opening up and turn China in on itself. This unprecedented phenomenon, of the rapid integration into the world of its most populous country, seems irreversible. There are things that could be done to make it easier to manage—including reform of the architecture of the global institutions that reflect a 60-year-old world order. But the world and China have to learn to live with each other.

For China, that means learning to respect foreigners' rights to engage it even on its “internal affairs”. A more measured response to such criticism is necessary not only to China's great-power ambitions, but also to its internal stability; for while the government may distract Chinese people from their domestic discontents by breathing fire at foreigners, such anger, once roused, can run out of control. In the end, China's leaders will have to deal with those frustrations head-on, by tackling the pollution, the corruption and the human-rights abuses that contribute to the country's dangerous mood. The Chinese people will demand it.

 

 

 

好像几年前冯小刚打算过筹拍《温故1942》，很可惜，现在的冯导的眼睛在说他没有这个力量，当然我不仅仅是说资金。

 

PS:BGM换成了t.a.t.u.的《30 minutes》，这两个毫不讳言自己是同性恋的俄罗斯女孩拥有极好的古典音乐素养，也拥有好嗓子和才华，嗯，是俺最近MP3的常驻。顾宾说当代作家大都不识外文，辩护者说文学不需要靠外语，那么音乐也一样，不是每个好歌手或者乐手都会古典音乐，但如果会的话，它无疑是演绎好的流行音乐的助力。所谓大气和小气，不出十个小节，就可以听出端倪了。文字也同样，忽忽。

30 minutes很象两个离经叛道孩子选择自己的道路一样，we could lose, we could fail, 30 minutes to shoulder the blame, 30 minutes to finally decide. 真是非凡的勇气。

                                30 minutes

歌手：T.A.T.U.

Mama, Papa, Forgive me Out of sight   Out of mind Out of time To decide Do we run?     Should I hide? For the rest Of my life Can we fly?     Do I stay? We could lose  We could fail In the moment  It takes To make plans  Or mistakes 30 minutes, a blink of an eye 30 minutes,to alter our lives 30 minutes,to make up my mind 30 minutes,to finally decide 30 minutes,to whisper your name 30 minutes,to shoulder the blame 30 minutes,of bliss, thirty lies 30 minutes,to finally decide Carousels  In the sky That we shape  With our eyes Under shade  Silhouettes Casting shade  Crying rain Can we fly?     Do I stay? We could lose  We could fail Either way      Options change Chances fail    Trains derail 30 minutes, a blink of an eye 30 minutes,to alter our lives 30 minutes,to make up my mind 30 minutes,to finally decide 30 minutes,to whisper your name 30 minutes,to shoulder the blame 30 minutes,of bliss, thirty lies 30 minutes,to finally decide To decide To decide, to decide, to decide To decide To decide, to decide, to decide To decide

 

另外奉送一个刘震云《一地鸡毛》的链接：http://www.white-collar.net/wx_hsz/xiandai/xd_37.htm

 

 

 

我覺得現在有很多人可能都有以下列舉的習慣，包括我在内（說的這五條我是全都有），最讓我感到氣憤的是第 4條，如果我的朋友不告訴我，我可能就一直被蒙在鼓裏，多花冤枉錢。所以我很希望看到此帖的人一定要注意對比自己是否也有這樣的習慣，并且盡可能的告訴自己的朋友，少讓人上當。 　　
　　
　　　　1、手機電池不要等到沒電才充電。
　　　　一般我們都會有一種想法就是手機的電池電力要全部放完再充電比較好基本上是沒錯的，因爲我們在以前使用的充電電池大部分是鎳氫( NiH )電池，而鎳氫電池有所謂的記憶效應若不放完電再充的話會導緻電池壽命急速減少。因此我們才會用到最後 一滴電才開始 充電。但現在的手機及一般IA産品大部分都用锂(Li)電池，而锂電池的話就沒有記憶效應的問題。若大家還是等到全部用完電後再充的話反而會使得 锂 電池内部的化學物質無法反應而壽命減少。最好的方法就是沒事就充電讓它随時随地保持最佳 滿格狀态 ，這樣你的電池就可用的又長又久喔。這是從廠商那得到的 訊息 ，并經過本身測試而得。
　　　　
　　　　2、 當手機正在充電時，請勿接電話!!
　　　　原因是手機在充電時，來電接聽的話會有潛在的危險。印度有一個31歲在保險公司任職業務經理的年輕人，十幾天前在手機還接着充電器的時候接聽電話，過了幾秒大量的電流經過手機，這個年輕人被摔落到地面，家人發現時，手指燒傷，心跳微弱，并且已經失去意識。經緊急送到醫院後，醫生宣布到院死亡。行動電話是目前大家最常使用的現代發明。然而，我們也必須要警覺到儀器緻死的危險。
　　　　
　　　　3、手機剩一格時不要使用
　　　　收訊滿格 與隻剩一格時相比,發射強度竟然相差1000倍以上.所以……常講手機的人……要 注意哦 ……^0^、昨天從一位交大教授那兒獲得一項很重要的 訊息 ，那就是當你發現手機的 收訊強度 隻剩下一格的時候，甯可挂斷不談或者是改用公用電話。千萬不要再滔滔不絕、口沫橫飛、濃情蜜意、欲罷不能、沒完沒了……爲什麽呢? 大家都知道手機的電磁波一直是讓人擔心的問題。而手機的設計爲了在 收訊較差 的地區仍能保有相當的通話質量， 會加強手 機的電磁波發射強度. 當收訊滿格 與隻剩一格時相比，發射強度竟然相差1000倍以上。
　　　　
　　　　4.17951+電話号碼=陷阱
　　　　我也向1860查詢過了. 如果你把17951+電話号碼儲存在電話号碼本裏?而不是單獨撥?收費就會從0.7元每分鍾變成1.3元每分鍾.他們的解釋是如果儲存在電話号碼本裏?系統将無法識别。所以獲得資費優惠，必須每次在鍵盤上直接按17xxx。神州 行用戶如此? 動感地帶用戶, 全球通也一樣 。如果你是一個中國移動用戶，當你知道中國移動爲你設置以下的陷阱的時候，便不再驚訝于你的話費爲何會像長了翅膀一樣的飛走。用17951+電話号碼可以優惠，但如果你預先将17951+電話号碼存在手機的電話本，使用的時候調出來然後拔打出去，這時中國移動不承認你使用了17951這種優惠的 拔打方式 ，而按照直接拔打的方式計費。如果你是在漫遊，兩種計費方式可以相差7倍之多！當我得知如此計費之後，我真的不知如何表達我的憤怒，後來打1860咨詢時，如果不是主動冶詢問這個問題，工号爲6608的小姐根本就不告訴我這樣的計費。
　　　　
　　　　5、手機費的寄生蟲
　　　　手機莫名其妙定置了無用短信,強烈建議大家都看一下自己有沒有中招，最簡單方法退訂每月偷你手機費的寄生蟲！ 中國移動在3.15被迫退出一項新業務，如果您是中國移動的手機用戶，鍵入數字0000，發送短信至186201，數秒鍾内将自動回複一條短信列表，顯示您的手機上究竟訂制了哪些短信服務，究竟是哪些短信 服務商明着 、暗着每月扣除您的手機費；鍵入數字00000，發送短信至186201，即可退 訂所有 短信服務 。
　　　　
　　　　　補充一點~
　　　　我們打電話的時候常常會爲了正好趕在1:00前結束而慶幸,但其實并不是這樣的,據一位中國移動的工作人員說,其實在你通話到0:55的時候就已經算一分鍾了,所以0:55~1:00的通話時間其實是算你2分鍾的錢~

 

 

 

 

       东方日报报道，河南新郑市郑州大学升达经贸管理学院的校园骚乱事件仍未平息，校方与学生的谈判未取得任何成果，数千学生正进行罢课罢考，以及在学校行政大楼前静坐抗议。19日数百名警员已进驻学校戒备以防再生事端。