跟老刘混去<财经>年会现场溜达了一圈, 听了一个房地产的谈话栏目.  三个主题, 房地产, 金融衍生品, PE. 场场爆满, 站的地方都没有. 等了半天,看有人出来才找到空站着听完了.

这个年会还是层面挺高, 晚上溜达一下我起码是见着了活着的任志强,潘石屹,还有老乡伏明霞的老公,梁锦松. 简单说说房地产论坛的情况.

基本嘉宾构成: 主持人1名+房地产商4个(包括1个香港恒隆地产的老总)+投行2个+经济学家2个. 

成分构成: 鼓吹型: 房地产商3个+投行2个+经济学家1个

                中立理性型: 房地产商1个

                危机泡沫论: 经济学家1个

需要指出的是, 王石不在场, 并且在场的鼓吹型的嘉宾在谈笑风生之间已经把"王石盖的房子是劣质房子"作为定论嘲笑. 而就本人曾经在房地产界做过的朋友的意见, 万科的房子一直是相当不错的.

从嘉宾构成和立场可以得出的基本观点:

一.  话语权仍然在一个庞大的利益集团手中, 因为王石的不合作他已经被这个集团排除在外.

二. 强盗头子可恶, 但是吠得最凶的肯定是那些"帮忙的"和"帮闲的".

三. 中国基金界无甚希望. 不仅智商不高,而且道德也高不哪去.

鼓吹方的基本观点还是老几条, 无甚新意. 明明开头都说要过冬了, 遇到困难了, 但是一说起问题来那是相当相当理直气壮. 鼓吹方用了很多数据来证明自己的观点, 但是中国的官方数据, 欧卖糕得.  主要观点如下:

一. 房地产市场没有泡沫.

(点评: 经济学有千千万万的理论, 正说反说总能够说通道理.  在1987年版的Palgrave经济学大辞典中引用著名经济学家，前美国经济学会会长金德尔伯格(C.Kindleberger)的话重新定义泡沫经济:“泡沫状态这个名词，随便一点说，就是一种或一系列资产在一个连续过程中陡然涨价，开始的价格上升会使人们产生还要涨价的预期，于是又吸引了新的买主--这些人一般只是想通过买卖牟取利润，而对这些资产本身的使用和产生盈利的能力是不感兴趣的。随着涨价常常是预期的逆转，接着就是价格暴跌，最后以金融危机告终。

简单来说, 购买方不是使用方, 也就是说, 需求当中有水分.)

二. 中国房地产市场没有供应过剩.

(点评: 任总用了很多数据来说明有多少居民,有多少需求,收入有多少增量. 但是明显地回避了其他问题: 1. 官方数据有多准. 2. 居民消费需求中多少是有效需求. 既然任总明白说过是为富人盖房子, 那请说明富人群的需求是多少. 3. 收入增量是平均值, 考虑到巨大的贫富差距, 作为大部分的平民阶层收入的增长率值得商榷. 像唯一有意思的经济学家谢国忠所说: 看人口的的话, 干么不去非洲建房??)

三. 房地产商辛辛苦苦盖房,赚得是辛苦钱而非暴利.

(点评: 我承认房地产商赚钱的利润率不如矿老板, 但是仍然属于暴利行业. 尽管看上去百分比没有史玉柱那么高, 但是盘面的大小为何不提. 一千万的100%和一亿的50%无法比. 可以说有很高的寻租成本, 但是与建筑成本相比, 房地产是绝对的暴利)

四. 房地产业不是死在自己的泡沫上,而是政府的乱调控上.

(点评: 根据刚刚泡沫的定义, 政府的调控也不过是为了限制投机性购房. 有钢性需求的话, 这些根本不足以影响房地产市场.

五. 保持房地产业的高速发展是保证经济发展的唯一途径.

(点评: 这些话TND更像是威胁. 由此可见当年经济方针错误已经造成了无可估量的影响. 房地产完蛋了, 钢材用量会锐减, 相关的产业都会遭受损失. 没错,但是应该意识到的是如果不是当年毫无节制的扩张, 钢厂的产能根本不会扩大到如今的规模. 如今的中国经济骑在房地产这头猛虎的身上, 上下不得. 但是与其维持虚伪的繁荣, 我宁可一步一步刺破泡沫, )

那个离谱的投行人士(貌似是高干家庭美景) 唧唧歪歪没完地指责大众对着房地产商就好像批斗周扒皮一样. 另一个投行的人士问了周围几个有钱人, 其中一个女的有五十多双鞋, 十几个钱包, 得出了中国人可以几年不消费的脑残结论. 还有对比投资股市的, 说投资房子仍然是最好的投资方式. 我的娘啊, 跟中国股市比, 那就好像跟武大郎比身高,和国足比足球一样.

这些杯钵满盆的既得利益者大略也小看了人民的智商. 任志强说老百姓是接受不了自己买不起好房子这种刺激而眼红, 产生"仇富"心态. 对着全世界最善良最温顺的老百姓说这种话可以直接去跳楼. 要知道, 真正"仇富"的人是不多的, 人都是向往财富的.  要看到的是"仇富"之后的真正被憎恶的对象——财富和权力的叠加。

财富借助权力完成了短时间内的光速积累，蚕食了劳动者辛辛苦苦劳作的积蓄。问题是所有这一切的始作俑者——govtment，究竟有没有能力收拾自己铺的烂摊子？摇摇头，叹口气，洗洗睡吧。

炎热的夏天

被Damien Rice的男声所击中

加上弥漫着淡淡忧伤情绪的大提琴

仿佛在虚无之中

看见了傍晚绚丽的晚霞

灿烂而热烈

却带着逝去的悲伤

cheers darlin'  

cheers darlin'
here's to you and your lover boy
cheers darlin'
i got years to wait around for you

cheers darlin'
i've got your wedding bells in my ear
cheers darlin'
you give me three cigarettes to smoke my tears away

and i die when you mention his name
and i lie i should have kissed you
when we were running in the rain

what am i darlin'?

a whisper in your ear?
a piece of your cake?

what am i darlin?
the boy you can fear?
or your biggest mistake?

cheers darlin'
here's to you and your lover man
cheers darlin'
i'll just hang around and eat from a can

cheers darlin'
i got a ribbon of green on my guitar
cheers darlin'
i got a beauty queen
to sit not very far from me

i die when he comes around to take you home
i'm too shy i should have kissed you
when we were alone

what am i darlin'?
a whisper in your ear?
a piece of your cake?

what am i darlin?
the boy you can fear?
or your biggest mistake?

what am i?
here's to you and your lover

what am i darlin'?
i got years to wait around for you

Angry China

May 1st 2008
From The Economist print edition

The recent glimpses of a snarling China should scare the country's government as much as the world

CHINA is in a frightening mood. The sight of thousands of Chinese people waving xenophobic fists suggests that a country on its way to becoming a superpower may turn out to be a more dangerous force than optimists had hoped. But it isn't just foreigners who should be worried by these scenes: the Chinese government, which has encouraged this outburst of nationalism, should also be afraid.

For three decades, having shed communism in all but the name of its ruling party, China's government has justified its monopolistic hold on power through economic advance. Many Chinese enjoy a prosperity undreamt of by their forefathers. For them, though, it is no longer enough to be reminded of the grim austerity of their parents' childhoods. They need new aspirations.

The government's solution is to promise them that China will be restored to its rightful place at the centre of world affairs. Hence the pride at winning the Olympics, and the fury at the embarrassing protests during the torch relay. But the appeal to nationalism is a double-edged sword: while it provides a useful outlet for domestic discontents (see article), it could easily turn on the government itself.

A million mutinies

The torch relay has galvanised protests about all manner of alleged Chinese crimes: in Tibet, in China's broader human-rights record, in its cosy relations with repellent regimes. And these in turn have drawn counter-protests from thousands of expatriate Chinese, from Chinese within the country and on the internet.

Chinese rage has focused on the alleged “anti-China” bias of the Western press, which is accused of ignoring violence by Tibetans in the unrest in March. From this starting-point China's defenders have gone on to denounce the entire edifice of Western liberal democracy as a sham. Using its tenets to criticise China is, they claim, sheer hypocrisy. They cite further evidence of double standards: having exported its dirtiest industries to China, the West wants the country to curb its carbon emissions, potentially impeding its growth and depriving newly well-off Chinese of their right to a motor car. And as the presidential election campaign in America progresses, more China-bashing can be expected, with protectionism disguised as noble fury at “coddling dictators”.

China's rage is out of all proportion to the alleged offences. It reflects a fear that a resentful, threatened West is determined to thwart China's rise. The Olympics have become a symbol of China's right to the respect it is due. Protests, criticism and boycott threats are seen as part of a broader refusal to accept and accommodate China.

There is no doubt genuine fury in China at these offences; yet the impression the response gives of a people united behind the government is an illusion. China, like India, is a land of a million mutinies now. Legions of farmers are angry that their land has been swallowed up for building by greedy local officials. People everywhere are aghast at the poisoning of China's air, rivers and lakes in the race for growth. Hardworking, honest citizens chafe at corrupt officials who treat them with contempt and get rich quick. And the party still makes an ass of the law and a mockery of justice.

Herein lies the danger for the government. Popular anger, once roused, can easily switch targets. This weekend China will be commemorating an event seen as pivotal in its long revolution—the protests on May 4th 1919 against the humiliation of China by the Versailles treaty (which bequeathed German “concessions” in China to Japan). The Communist Party had roots in that movement. Now, as then, protests at perceived slights against China's dignity could turn against a government accused of not doing enough to safeguard it.

Remember the ides of May

Western businessmen and policymakers are pulled in opposite directions by Chinese anger. As the sponsors of the Olympics have learned to their cost, while consumer- and shareholder-activists in the West demand they take a stand against perceived Chinese abuses, in China itself firms' partners and customers are all too ready to take offence. Western policymakers also face a difficult balancing act. They need to recognise that China has come a long way very quickly, and offers its citizens new opportunities and even new freedoms, though these are still far short of what would constitute democracy. Yet that does not mean they should pander to China's pride. Western leaders have a duty to raise concerns about human rights, Tibet and other “sensitive” subjects. They do not need to resign themselves to ineffectiveness: up to a point, pressure works: China has been modestly helpful over Myanmar, North Korea and Sudan. It has even agreed to reopen talks with the Dalai Lama's representatives. This has happened because of, not despite, criticism from abroad.

Pessimists fear that if China faces too much such pressure, hardliners within the ruling elite will triumph over the “moderates” in charge now. But even if they did, it is hard to see how they could end the 30-year-old process of opening up and turn China in on itself. This unprecedented phenomenon, of the rapid integration into the world of its most populous country, seems irreversible. There are things that could be done to make it easier to manage—including reform of the architecture of the global institutions that reflect a 60-year-old world order. But the world and China have to learn to live with each other.

For China, that means learning to respect foreigners' rights to engage it even on its “internal affairs”. A more measured response to such criticism is necessary not only to China's great-power ambitions, but also to its internal stability; for while the government may distract Chinese people from their domestic discontents by breathing fire at foreigners, such anger, once roused, can run out of control. In the end, China's leaders will have to deal with those frustrations head-on, by tackling the pollution, the corruption and the human-rights abuses that contribute to the country's dangerous mood. The Chinese people will demand it.

上周末还是去影院看了集结号, 结论是优点缺点都很明显的片子. 以冯小刚的能力, 捣鼓到这一步已经很不错了, 但是也足以凸显他离大师之境还有待修炼.

优点主要在于:

1. 场面. 相对于以往的战争片, 战斗场面拍得更加好看,也更好莱坞. 但是让人比较不爽的是让人震撼的战争场面特效是棒子的作品. 冯作为导演对镜头的处理并不算太优秀, 晃镜有点乱, 完全没有<拯救大兵>里面的战地记者视角来得流畅.所以这个优点很大程度上归功于棒子们. 

2. 人物. 我这里都是和以往的中国片比,不是跟大兵瑞恩那种比. 不管怎么讲,这片里的人还都有血有肉, 该怕的时候还是怕的, 该骂的时候还是骂的.

3.演员.张涵予的确是个好演员,无论如何谷子地还算是个成功的角色, 这一点张涵予功不可没. 王宝强等人基本不过不失,但是有时候演员也没办法,剧本的问题.

还是重点说说缺点,因为整个片子还是让我十分不舒服.

1.主题. 片子的基调非常根正苗红,影片回避了战争的性质讨论,回避了人性讨论,归结到了"组织认定".前半的惨烈牺牲,后半的苦苦追寻,最后却发现落脚点承受不住这种力度.那么多条命,谷子地那么多年的寻找,只是要回一个"名分". 这大概不是处于现代的我们可以赞同的. 为了什么? 为了那六百斤大米? 组织不认定的话他们的死就没意义了? 老冯可以说:我就是拍商业片,不去追究意义.这个主题就是能迎合头脑简单的FQ们,就是能过审查. OK,我也没有话讲.

2.剧本. 李安说中国没有好编剧.这话大概不假.而且现在越来越差. 我想老冯要表达的"集结号"的意思并非战争年代的集结号,也包括谷子地背负的没有听到的号声,在他余后的几十年里.但是剧本前后差距太大,让人难有相连接之感. 如果以一个时段为主,然后穿插另一个年代可能会好一些, 或者相应减少后半的时间. 跟紧凑的战斗相比,后半的寻觅太过琐碎而且拖沓,断层剧烈. 尤其朝鲜战争一段,大概是全篇被人记得最多的,因为那个"前轱辘不转后轱辘不转斯密达".从这里我们窥见了原本的冯小刚,会心一笑. 但是正同<天下无贼>里的无厘头抢劫一段, 虽然占尽眼球, 但不得不说是破坏整体协调性的大败笔.而且为了更好地讲故事,这一段其实最好在二斗和谷子地的回忆或者什么事情里抖搂出来, 单独安这么一段太刻意, 感觉编剧小时候写日记是不是只会写流水账那种啊?

3. 人物塑造. 群像描写,但是每个人的印象并不深刻. 谷子地说"爹妈都给他们起了名字的",但是很遗憾,片子看完,除了谷子地,二斗和王金权, 其他的几个我仍然没记得名字. 有很多战争场面,很惨烈,但是有限的篇幅,没能好好地描写每个人.于是我不是太明白感动到哭的人到底感动啥? 感动于谷子地的执着么? 那群大兵里我咋就记得那个啃饼的, 还有狙击的如果不是王宝强来演我肯定啥印象也没有. 群像, 有限的空间, 有限的时间, 每个人的独特个性, 这个是导演的功力. 不是每个人都能坐到杜琪峰那样.

既然是同期作品, 不得不跟投名状做一比较. 我不明白的是为什么会有那么多人觉得集结号比投名状要强. 无论从剧本,导演,演员,主题任何一个方面来看都无疑是投名状占上风.

起码投名状的剧本完整, 故事一气呵成. 只是影院版剪掉了不少东西让人郁闷. 投名状若是减去三人杀人立状的情节, 这个"投名状"所承载的意义就完全体现不出来.

投名状可以理解为匹夫和政治家的歧路, 可以理解为政治权谋下个人情义的渺小与不堪一击, 当然我的理解是"血酬定律"的注脚. 这个完全符合朱大可的"流氓文明"哲学, 中国历史则正是在一次次的官匪转化中形成的. 民,匪,官,兵,人不过是选择更容易吃饱或者获得权势金钱的一条路而已. 其实刘德华和金城武都不是说因为是匪所以入不了行,而是他们不够"流氓".能流氓到朱元璋那样, 才能立足于那些老奸巨猾的干老头子之上.

表演方面李连杰的文戏已是出人意表, 刘德华不过不失, 金城武良好发挥, 冷兵器的战争场面也是相当残酷. 不要说苏州不下雪, 看看现在的南方?

最后回到集结号, 说两句.

1. 问个技术问题. 被炸药包炸的粉碎的烈士尸体, 挖出来后能数出76个么?

2. 前天晚上老刘跟我说起打仗的时候, 有一路红军到了他爷爷奶奶的村子决定驻扎吃饭. 煮汤吃到一半突然有敌袭, 一个十多岁的小战士来敲他奶奶家门:"大娘大娘,我们要打仗啦,我拿汤跟您换点干粮."  家里只有3两饼, 差着2两. 小战士拿着饼一路跑:"我们还会回来的, 我回来再拿."   第二天, 部队回来了. 小战士却没有回来拿那二两饼.

我很冷血地看完了集结号, 这个时候却觉得眼眶有点湿.